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DO INVESTORS OVERVALUE FIRMS 
WITH BLOATED BALANCE SHEETS? 
 
 
When cumulative net operating income (accounting value-added) outstrips 
cumulative free cash flow (cash value-added), subsequent earnings growth is weak. If 
investors with limited attention focus on accounting profitability, and neglect 
information about cash profitability, then net operating assets, the cumulation of the 
discrepancies between the two, measures the extent to which reporting outcomes 
provoke over-optimism. During the 1964-2002 sample period, net operating assets 
scaled by total assets is a strong negative predictor of long-run stock returns. 
Predictability is robust with respect to an extensive set of controls and testing methods. 
1.  Introduction 
Information is vast, and attention limited.  People therefore simplify their judgments 
and decisions by using rules of thumb, and by processing only subsets of available 
information. Experimental psychologists and accountants document that individuals, 
including investors and financial professionals, concentrate on a few salient stimuli (see 
e.g., the surveys of Fiske and Taylor (1991) and Libby, Bloomfield, Nelson (2002)).  
Doing so is a cognitively frugal way of making good, though suboptimal decisions.  An 
investor who values a firm based on its earnings performance rather than performing a 
complete analysis of financial variables is following such a strategy.  
Several authors have argued that limited investor attention and processing power 
cause systematic errors that affect market prices.
1  Systematic errors may derive from a 
failure to think through the implications of accounting rule changes or earnings 
management. However, even if accounting rules and firms’ discretionary accounting 
choices are held fixed, some operating/reporting outcomes will highlight positive or 
negative aspects of performance more than others. 
In this paper, we propose that the level of net operating assets ― defined as the 
difference on the balance sheet between all operating assets and all operating liabilities 
— measures the extent to which operating/reporting outcomes provoke excessive investor 
optimism. We will argue that the financial position of a firm with high net operating 
assets is less attractive than superficial appearances suggest. In other words, a high level 
                                                 
1 See, e.g., Hirshleifer and Teoh (2003), Hirshleifer, Lim and Teoh (2003), Hong, Torous, and 
Valkanov (2003), Hong and Stein (2003), Pollet (2003), Della Vigna and Pollet (2003), and the 
review of Daniel, Hirshleifer and Teoh (2002). 
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 of net operating assets, scaled to control for firm size, indicates a lack of sustainability of 
recent earnings performance.   
A basic accounting identity states that a firm’s net operating assets are equal to the 
cumulation over time of the difference between net operating income and free cash flow 
(see Penman (2004), p.230 for the identity in change form): 




0 t T Flow   Cash   Free Income   Operating Assets   Operating   Net             (1) 
Thus, net operating assets are a cumulative measure of the deviation between accounting 
value added and cash value added — ‘balance sheet bloat’. 
An accumulation of accounting earnings without a commensurate accumulation of 
free cash flows raises doubts about future profitability. In fact, we document that high 
normalized net operating assets (indicating relative weakness of cumulative free cash 
flow relative to cumulative earnings) is associated with a rising trend in earnings that is 
not subsequently sustained. Furthermore, as argued in more detail in Section 2, high net 
operating assets may provide a warning signal about the profitability of investment.  
If investors have limited attention and fail to discount for the unsustainability of 
earnings growth, then firms with high net operating assets will be overvalued relative to 
those with low net operating assets. In the long run, such mispricing will on average be 
corrected. This implies that firms with high net operating assets will on average earn 
negative long-run abnormal returns, and those with low net operating assets will earn 
positive long-run abnormal returns. 
To understand the determinants of investor perceptions in greater depth, we can 
alternatively decompose net operating assets as follows. Since free cash flow is the 
difference between cash flow from operations and investment, we obtain: 
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Equation (2) indicates that net operating assets is the sum of two cumulative differences 
between accounting and cash value added: (Operating Income Before Depreciation −    
Operating Cash Flow), and (Investment −Depreciation). Thus, firms with high net 
operating assets have high cumulative deviation between accounting and cash 
profitability derived from both operating and investing activities. Simplifying (2) yields  




0 t T Investment Accruals   Operating Assets   Operating   Net                     
which expresses net operating assets as the sum of cumulative operating accruals, and 
cumulative investment.  
  Two simple examples illustrate how a transaction can increase accounting 
profitability relative to cash basis profitability, contributing to balance sheet bloat 
(Section 2 describes the range of possible cases more fully). First, when a firm books a 
sale as a receivable before it has received the actual cash inflow, its net operating assets 
increase. Second, when a firm records an expenditure as an investment rather than an 
expense, its net operating assets increase. In both these cases, current accounting 
profitability may not be sustained in the future, so investors who focus on accounting 
income may overvalue the firm. 
A possible reason why high net operating assets may be followed by disappointment 
is that the high level is a result of an extended pattern of earnings management that must 
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 soon be reversed; see Barton and Simko (2002).
2 Alternatively, even if firms do not 
deliberately manage investor perceptions, investors with limited attention may fail to 
make full use of available accounting information. Thus, the interpretation of net 
operating assets that we provide in this paper accommodates, but does not require, 
earnings management.
3  
Net operating assets can provide a more complete proxy for investor misperceptions 
than the measures used in past literature for two reasons. First, net operating assets by 
definition consist of the deviations between cash and accounting profitability, rather than 
merely being correlated with these deviations.
4  
Second, under our hypothesis, flow variables such as accruals provide only a 
fragmentary indicator of the degree to which operating/reporting outcomes provoke 
excessive investor optimism. As equations (1) and (2) indicate, net operating assets 
reflect the full history of flows. If investors with limited attention do not make full use of 
balance sheet information, then net operating assets is potentially a more comprehensive 
                                                 
2 If investors overvalue a firm that manages earnings upward, the price will tend to correct 
downward when further earnings management becomes infeasible.  Barton and Simko provide 
evidence from 1993-1999 that the level of net operating assets inversely predicts a firm’s ability 
to meet analysts’ forecasts. Barton and Simko’s perspective further suggests that low net 
operating assets constrain firms’ ability to manage earnings downward (in order to take a big bath 
or create ‘rainy day’ reserves; see DeFond (2002)). Choy (2003) documents that the Barton and 
Simko (2002) finding derives from industry variations in net operating assets.    
3 A branch of the accruals literature provides evidence that managers take advantage of investor 
naiveté about accruals to manage perceptions of auditors, analysts, and investors. See, e.g., Teoh, 
Welch, and Wong (1998a, b), Rangan (1998), Ali, Hwang and Trombley (2000), Bradshaw, 
Richardson, and Sloan (2000), Xie (2001), and Teoh and Wong (2002).  
4 For example, current-period operating accruals are negative predictors of stock returns for up to 
two years ahead (Sloan (1996)). Our hypothesis that investor misperceptions result from 
deviations between accounting and cash profitability suggests that an index of misperceptions 
should reflect both working capital accruals and the deviation between investment and 
depreciation (see equation (2)). By incorporating depreciation but not investment, operating 
accruals do not fully capture the latter deviation. 
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 return predictor than the single-period slices considered in past literature.
5 Alternative 
measures of accruals, a flow variable, have been found to have different explanatory 
power for returns (see, e.g., Collins and Hribar (2002), Teoh, Welch, and Wong (1998a, 
b), and Thomas and Zhang (2002)). Richardson, Sloan, Soliman, and Tuna (2003) and 
Fairfield, Whisenant and Yohn (2003) report evidence of one-year-ahead stock return 
predictability based upon the most recent period operating and investing accruals.   We 
document here that the level of normalized net operating assets has greater power, over a 
longer horizon, to predict returns than the associated flow variables.  
To test for investor misperceptions of firms with bloated balance sheets, we measure 
stock returns subsequent to the reporting of net operating assets. The level of net 
operating assets scaled by beginning total assets (hereafter NOA) is a strong and robust 
negative predictor of future stock returns for at least three years after balance sheet 
information is released. We call this the sustainability effect, because high NOA is an 
indicator that past accounting performance has been good but that equally good 
performance is unlikely to be sustained in the future; and that investors with limited 
attention will overestimate the sustainability of accounting performance.  
A trading strategy based upon buying the lowest NOA decile and selling short the 
highest NOA decile is profitable in 35 out of the 38 years in the sample, and averages 
equally-weighted monthly abnormal returns of 1.24 %, 0.83% and 0.57%, all highly 
significant, in the first, second and third year, respectively, after the release of the balance 
sheet information. The effect remains strong with value weights, and further risk 
adjustments using factor models. The Sharpe ratio for an equally weighted trading 
                                                 
5 A stock measure is also simpler, as it derives from the current year balance sheet, whereas a 
flow measure is calculated as a difference across years in balance sheet numbers. 
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 strategy based on the extreme NOA deciles and characteristic-adjusted returns in year 
t+1, for example, is 1.66, indicating a reward to risk ratio that is very attractive relative to 
holding the stock market as a whole. 
The effect also remains strong after including various past return measures and 
current-period operating accruals in Fama and MacBeth (1973) cross-sectional 
regressions.  The coefficient on NOA is highly statistically significant, indicating that the 
sustainability effect is distinct from the monthly contrarian effect (Jegadeesh (1990)), the 
momentum effect (Jegadeesh and Titman 1993), the long-run winner/loser effect 
(DeBondt and Thaler (1985), and the accruals anomaly (Sloan (1996)). In addition, since 
book-to-market and past returns are measures of past and prospective growth, these 
controls suggest that the findings are not a risk premium effect associated with the firm’s 
growth rate.  
Since operating and financing sides of the balance sheet are equal, net operating 
assets equal the sum of net external financing via equity and net financial obligations 
(debt – cash).  In a multiple regression, we find that the financing correlates of NOA--- 
scaled equity, debt, and (the negative of) cash--- also significantly predict future returns 
with roughly comparable coefficients. Thus, the predictive power of NOA is related not 
just to cumulative net equity and debt financing, but to whether this new financing is 
invested or is accumulated as greater cash holdings. Furthermore, the ability of NOA to 
predict returns is robust with respect to the scaling variable, and to eliminating from the 
sample firms with equity issuance or M&A activity exceeding 10% of total assets. So the 




 The evidence from the negative relation between NOA and subsequent returns 
suggests that investors do not optimally use the information contained in NOA to assess 
the sustainability of performance. A Mishkin (1983) test that includes accruals, cash 
flows, and NOA as forecasting variables of future earnings and returns is consistent with 
investor overoptimism about the earnings prospects of high-NOA firms.  
Further tests indicate that NOA remains a strong return predictor after additionally 
controlling for the sum of the last three years’ operating accruals, and the latest change in 
NOA. These findings suggest that NOA provides a cumulative measure of investor 
misperceptions about the sustainability of financial performance that captures 
information beyond that contained in flow variables such as operating accruals or the 
latest change in NOA.  
Finally, we find that the sustainability effect has continued to be strong during the 
most recent 5 years. The sustainability effect was strongest in 1999 coinciding with the 
recent boom market, and the predictive power of NOA is robust to the exclusion of this 
year. The predictive effect of NOA remained strong even during the market downturn in 
2000. Thus, it seems that arbitrageurs were not, in our sample, fully alerted to NOA as a 
return predictor.       
  
2.  Motivation and Hypotheses  
A premise of our hypothesis is that investors have limited attention and cognitive 
processing power. Theory predicts that limited attention will affect market prices and 
trades in systematic ways. In the model of Hirshleifer and Teoh (2003), information that 
is more salient or which requires less cognitive processing is used by more investors, and 
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 as a result is impounded more fully into price. Investors’ valuations of a firm therefore 
depend on how transactions are categorized and presented, holding information content 
constant. Reporting, disclosure, and news outcomes that highlight favorable aspects of 
the available information set imply overpricing, and therefore negative subsequent 
abnormal stock returns. Similarly, outcomes that highlight adverse aspects imply 
undervaluation, and positive long-run abnormal stock returns. 
Several empirical findings address these propositions. There is evidence that stock 
prices react to the republication of obscure but publicly available information when 
provided in a more salient or easily processed form.
6 Furthermore, there is evidence that 
market prices do not reflect long-term information implicit in demographic data for future 
industry product demand (Della Vigna and Pollet (2003)), and that a shock arising in a 
specific industry takes time to be impounded in the stocks of firms in other industries.
7 
Hirshleifer and Teoh (2003) predict that stocks with high disclosed but unrecognized 
employee stock option expenses should on average earn negative long-run abnormal 
returns, as should firms with large positive discrepancies between disclosed pro forma 
versus GAAP definitions of earnings. Subsequent tests confirm these implications 
(Doyle, Lundholm and Soliman (2003), Garvey and Milbourn (2004)).   
If attention is sufficiently limited, investors will tend to treat an information category 
such as earnings uniformly, i.e., functional fixation, even when, owing to different 
accounting treatments, its meaning varies.  Several empirical studies examine the effects 
of accounting rules or discretionary accounting choices by the firm on market valuations.  
                                                 
6 See Ho and Michaely (1988); the empirical tests and debate of the ‘extended functional fixation 
hypothesis’ in Hand (1990, 1991) and Ball and Kothari (1991); and Huberman and Regev (2001).  
7 Recent tests identify industry lead-lags effects in stock returns lasting for up to two months 




 Since such treatments affect earnings, they will affect the valuations of investors who use 
earnings mechanically, even if the information content provided to observers is held 
constant. As discussed in the review of Kothari (2001), the empirical evidence from tests 
of such ‘functional fixation’ is mixed.   
The operating accruals anomaly of Sloan (1996) is a natural implication of limited 
attention; more processing is required to examine each of the cash flow and operating 
accrual pieces of earnings separately than to examine earnings alone. However, this 
argument does not explain why investors focus on earnings alone rather than cash flow 
alone. 
If scarce investor attention is to be assigned to a single flow measure of value-added, 
the earnings may be the better choice. Past research shows that there is information in 
operating accruals that makes earnings more highly correlated than cash flow with 
contemporaneous stock returns (Dechow (1994)). This may explain why in practice, 
valuation based on earnings comparables (such as P/E and PEG ratios) is common. 
Nevertheless, a pure focus on earnings leads to systematic errors, as it neglects the 
incremental information contained in cash flow value-added. 
The level of net operating assets can help identify those operating/reporting outcomes 
that highlight the more positive versus negative aspects of performance, thereby 
provoking investor errors. As discussed in the introduction, it does so by providing a 
cumulative measure of the difference over time between accounting value added 
(earnings) and cash value added (free cash flow).  Cumulative net operating income 
measures the success of the firm over time in generating value after covering all 
operating expenses, including depreciation.  Similarly, cumulative free cash flow 
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 measures the success of the firm over time in generating cash flow in excess of capital 
expenditures.  
If past free cash flow deserves positive weight, along with past earnings, in a rational 
forecast of the firm's future earnings, then the deviation between the two (the excess of 
earnings over free cash flow) will contain adverse information about future changes in 
earnings incremental to the information contained in past earnings. An investor who 
naively forms valuations based upon the information in past earnings will tend to esteem 
a firm with high net operating assets for its strong earnings stream, without discounting 
adequately for the firm's relative weakness in generating free cash flow. 
This argument does not require that cumulative free cash flow be a more accurate 
measure of value added than cumulative earnings, nor that accounting accruals be largely 
noise. Even if earnings is as good or better a predictor of future profits as free cash flow, 
there can be mispricing so long as investors overweight earnings. What the argument 
does require is that cumulative free cash flows contain some incremental information 
about the firm’s prospects that is not subsumed by cumulative earnings.  
There are at least two reasons why cumulative free cash flow is incrementally 
informative beyond cumulative earnings about future prospects. First, since accruals and 
cash flows have different persistence (Dechow (1994)), information about the separate 
pieces provides better forecasting power than knowing earnings alone. Second, free cash 
flow additionally reflects the information embodied in cumulative investment levels, 
which can be correlated with future firm performance both directly, and in interaction 
with operating accruals.
8  
                                                 
8 Since our focus is on the difference between accounting value-added versus cash value-added, it 
is most helpful to think of the above two reasons, and the detailed support arguments that follow, 
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 With regard to the first point (the predictive power of the split of earnings between 
cash flow and operating accruals), if high cumulative accruals derive from earnings 
management, then these adjustments may not accurately reflect the economic condition 
of the firm. Even if accruals are informative, such noise reduces the optimal weight that a 
rational forecaster should place on past earnings versus cash flows in predicting future 
performance. 
Even if managers do not manage earnings, certain types of problems in the firm’s 
operations will tend to increase net operating assets, such as high levels of lingering, 
unpaid receivables.
9 To the extent that high receivables may not be fully realized in cash, 
they contain adverse incremental information (beyond that in past earnings) about future 
earnings. Therefore, when high cumulative working capital accruals increase net 
operating assets, an investor who fails to discount for adverse information about low 
quality receivables will overvalue the firm.   
  A mirror image of this reasoning applies to firms with high cumulative deferred 
revenues. Customer cash advances not yet recognized as revenues on the income 
statement increase cash flow relative to earnings, and so decrease net operating assets.  
If high deferred revenues are indicative of future earnings to come, deferred revenues 
contain favorable incremental information (beyond that in past earnings) about future 
earnings. So when high cumulative cash advances decrease net operating assets, an 
                                                                                                                                                 
as referring to cumulative non-depreciation operating accruals, and to investment in excess of 
depreciation (as in the decomposition in equation (2)). However, since previous literature has 
focused on accruals, for convenient brevity we refer simply to cumulative operating accruals and 
cumulative investment.  
9 Although receivables are short-term, the worst receivables will tend to linger, stretching the 
period during which accruals accumulate. Furthermore, if the lingering of receivables today is 
indicative of a high failure rate on new receivables in the next year, the problem telescopes 
forward.  Such chaining of bad receivables will tend to elongate the period during which 
mispricing corrects out. 
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 investor who fails to take into account the favorable information contained in the high 
deferred revenues will tend to undervalue the firm.   
Combining these elements, we see that high cumulative working capital accruals that 
derive, for example, from high unpaid receivables or low deferred revenues increase net 
operating assets, contain adverse information about future earnings prospects. Such 
working capital accruals will encourage investors with limited attention to overvalue the 
firm.
10 This implies that high net operating assets are associated with low subsequent 
stock returns.  
We now turn to the second point, that the investment piece of cumulative free cash 
flow may provide information about future performance (incremental to the information 
contained in earnings). As equation (3) makes clear, even a firm that has zero operating 
accruals can have high net operating assets. High cumulative investment can be a 
favorable indicator about investment opportunities, but can also indicate low future 
profitability if this level results from empire-building agency problems or managerial 
overoptimism. Even investment with positive net present value may be associated with 
low future profits if this investment is a result of obsolescence of the firm’s fixed assets.  
Regardless of whether high investment is associated with high or low future 
profitability, if investors are over-optimistic about the relation between investment and 
future profitability, they will overvalue high-investment firms. For example, if investors 
with limited attention focus on earnings without conditioning on investment, then they 
                                                 
10 High net operating assets firms have high past earnings and earnings growth, which on average 
predicts higher future earnings as well. So we do not argue that future earnings will be lower for 
high net operating assets firms than for low net operating assets firms, but that the earnings of 
high net operating assets firms will on average decline, whereas the earnings of low net operating 
assets firms will increase. Our discussion below concerns the adverse information about firm 
prospects contained in the investment piece of free cash flow, which is incremental to the 
favorable information contained in past earnings growth. 
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 will not fully discount for the fact that high investment today is associated with earnings-
reducing depreciation in the future. Furthermore, a possible reason for a high cumulative 
investment level is that certain expenditures that are not certain of providing long-term 
payoffs are classified as investments rather than as expenses (possibly, though not 
necessarily, because of earnings management). If investors fail to discount fully for this 
possibility, they will tend to overvalue firms with high investment levels.   
Furthermore, cumulative investment and cumulative accruals can interact as 
forecasters of earnings. We have argued that a high level of cumulative accruals is a 
warning signal that investors may be too optimistic about the firm’s future prospects. In 
such a circumstance, high cumulative investment tends to be a further indicator of 
overvaluation, because it indicates that the firm is investing heavily at a time when 
investors are overoptimistic about prospects for profitable growth.   
Again, such investment could be a result of managerial agency problems and bias. 
Alternatively, as mentioned before, even positive net present value investment may be 
correlated with low future profits if the need for investment is a result of obsolescence of 
the firm’s fixed assets (consistent with low unbooked sales). For example, when customer 
advances decline, new investment in production facilities may be necessary to maintain 
product quality and market share, and hence the preexisting level of the net cash flow 
stream. Finally, even if the investment is associated with substantial payoffs, investors 
who do not attend to adverse balance sheet information about operations may 
overestimate the return on investment. These possibilities all suggest that the combination 
of high cumulative operating accruals and high cumulative investment is an indication 
that the firm is unlikely to sustain investor expectations about profit increases.    
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 Selecting firms based on high net operating assets reflects both positive and adverse 
aspects of accruals and investment.
 11 Rising cumulative accruals can reflect growth and 
cash to come, but can also indicate lingering problems in converting accruals into actual 
cash flow. High cumulative investment can reflect strong investment opportunities, but 
can also reflect overinvestment, a need to replace obsolescent fixed assets, or that the 
accounting system has classified some expenditure with short-term payoff as long-term 
investment.  
High earnings and earnings growth per se are indicators of good business conditions 
and growth opportunities, and may be associated with high accruals and investment. If 
strong earnings are in large part corroborated by strong cash flow, then business 
conditions are more likely to be good, high accruals are more likely to be converted into 
future cash flow, and investment may add substantial value.  
However, high net operating assets firms are selected not by earnings growth per 
se, but by the relative shortfall between free cash flow and earnings. When this shortfall 
is large, the favorable cumulative earnings performance receives relatively little 
corroboration from cash flow net of investment expenditures. This situation calls forth 
the dark side of accruals and investment—at least relative to investors’ optimistic 
forecasts. Investors with limited attention do not put sufficient weight on the possibility 
that the high cumulative investment of these firms represents either overinvestment, 
replacement of obsolescent fixed assets, or investment with relatively transient payoff. 
They will therefore overvalue firms with high net operating assets and undervalue firms 
with low net operating assets.   
                                                 
11 Net operating assets can be high even though either cumulative investment or cumulative 
accruals is low. However, since high net operating assets is the sum of cumulative investment and 
accruals, statistically it will be associated with high levels of both.   
 14
 
 Reinforcing intuition is provided by equation (2). The last two terms reflect the 
difference between cumulative investment and cumulative depreciation. For a firm in a 
zero-nominal-growth steady state, current investment is equal to current depreciation, so 
the latest change in net operating assets is equal to the non-depreciation operating 
accruals. Thus, a firm with high net operating assets is likely to have had high growth, in 
the sense that cumulative investment has been higher than cumulative depreciation, and 
to have had high non-depreciation accruals. This decomposition confirms the intuition 
discussed earlier that scaled net operating assets proxies both for misinterpretations 
relating to investment activity and to operating accruals.
12 
Finally, by equation (3), firms with high net operating assets will tend to have high 
cumulative past investment. If the investment exceeded internally generated cash, they 
must have financed some of this investment through external finance. It is therefore 
useful to verify whether any relation between scaled net operating assets and subsequent 
stock returns is incremental to the new issues puzzle of Loughran and Ritter (1995). We 
describe such tests in Subsection 4.2.   
 
3. Sample Selection, Variable Measurement, and Data Description 
Starting with all NYSE/AMEX and NASDAQ firms in the intersection of the 2002 
COMPUSTAT and CRSP tapes, the sample period spans 462 months from July 1964 
through December 2002. To be included in the analysis, all firms are required to have 
sufficient financial data to compute accruals, net operating asset, firm size, and book-to-
                                                 
12 In the decomposition of equation (2) the latest change in net operating assets is equal to the 
sum of current operating accruals and current investment. To the extent that net operating assets 
is a proxy for growth, any ability of scaled net operating assets to predict returns can reflect risk 
rather than market inefficiency. It is therefore important in empirical testing to control for 
growth-related risk measures. 
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 market ratio. This results in an initial sample of 1,625,570 firm-month observations. 
Further restrictions are imposed for some of our tests. 
 
3.1 Measurement of NOA, Earnings, Cash Flows, and Accruals 
  Scaled net operating assets (NOA) are calculated as the difference between 
operating assets and operating liabilities, scaled by lagged total assets, as: 
  NOAt   = (Operating Assetst −  Operating Liabilitiest) / Total Assetst-1                (4) 
Operating assets are calculated as the residual from total assets after subtracting financial 
assets, and operating liabilities are the residual amount from total assets after subtracting 
financial liabilities and equity, as follows: 
Operating Assetst = Total Assetst − Cash and Short-Term Investmentt                             (5)  
Operating Liabilitiest = Total Assetst − Short-Term Debtt - Long-Term Debtt 
 -  Minority Interestt - Preferred Stockt - Common Equityt .  (6) 
Table 1 provides the associated Compustat item numbers. We also consider an alternative 
net operating asset calculation in subsection 4.1.3 because some items are inherently 
difficult to classify as either operating or financing.  
  The accounting firm performance variables, Earnings and Cash Flows, are 
defined respectively as income from continuing operations (Compustat#178)/lagged total 
assets, and as Earnings – Accruals. The latter variable is operating accruals, and is 
calculated using the indirect balance sheet method as the change in non-cash current 
assets less the change in current liabilities excluding the change in short-term debt and 
the change in taxes payable minus depreciation and amortization expense, deflated by 
lagged total assets,   
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 Accrualst = [(∆Current Assetst - ∆Casht) - (∆Current Liabilitiest - ∆Short-term Debtt              
  - ∆Taxes Payablet) - Depreciation and Amortization Expenset]/Total Assetst-1. (7) 
As in previous studies using operating accruals prior to SFAS #95 in 1988, we use this 
method to ensure consistency of the measure over time, and for comparability of results 
with the past studies. We include Accruals and the most recent change in NOA scaled by 
beginning total assets as control variables to evaluate whether NOA provides incremental 
predictive power for returns.   
  When calculating net operating assets and operating accruals, if short-term debt, 
taxes payable, long-term debt, minority interest, or preferred stock has missing values, we 
treat these values as zeroes to avoid unnecessary loss of observations.  Because we scale 
by lagged assets, the Earnings variable reflects a return on assets invested at the 
beginning of the period.  The stock return predictability that we document remains 
significant when we scale by ending instead of beginning total assets, scale by current or 
lagged sales, and impose a number of robustness data screens such as excluding firms in 
the bottom size deciles or stock price less than 5 dollars. 
 
3.2 Measurement of Asset Pricing Control Variables  
  We employ a number of known cross-sectional determinants of stock returns in 
our tests of return predictability. Size is the market value of common equity (in millions 
of dollars) measured as the closing price at fiscal year end multiplied by the number of 
common shares outstanding.  The book-to-market ratio is the book value of common 
equity divided by the market value of common equity, both measured at fiscal year end.   
In addition to these two variables, we also include a number of past return proxies 
to control for the one month-reversal, 12-month momentum, and three-year reversal 
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 effect, all measured relative to the test month t of returns. Ret(-1:-1) is the return on the 
stock in month t-1. Ret(-12:-2) is the cumulative return from month t-12 through month t-
2. Finally, Ret(-36:-13) is the cumulative return from month t-36 through month t-12. 
Thus, the return control variables are updated each month. The NOA, Accruals, Size and 
Book-to-market variables, however, are only updated every 12 months.  
 
3.3 Summary Statistics 
Table 1 reports the mean and median values for selected characteristics of NOA 
deciles, where firms are ranked annually by NOA and sorted into ten portfolios.  Net 
operating assets vary from about a median of 26% of lagged total assets in the lowest 
NOA decile to about 145% in the highest NOA decile.  This suggests that high NOA 
firms are likely to have experienced recent very rapid growth,
13 which opens the 
possibility that investors may have misperceived the sustainability of this growth.   
Table 1 reports that Low NOA firms in the ranking year experience poor earnings 
performance while high NOA firms experience good earnings performance; earnings 
vary monotonically from a median of 0% for NOA decile 1 to 13.6% for NOA decile 10. 
This difference in performance is driven by large differences in Accruals across NOA 
deciles. Accruals increase monotonically across NOA deciles for both mean and median 
measures; from -9.1% median for NOA decile 1 to +13.4% median for NOA decile 10.  
Operating Cash Flows do not vary monotonically across deciles. NOA decile 10, 
however, has significantly lower Cash Flows than all other deciles.  NOA decile 1’s Cash 
                                                 
13 Equations (2) and (3) suggest that new investments and M&A activity are likely to have 
contributed to the high growth in the top NOA decile. M&A, however, is not necessarily the 
cause of the relation between NOA and returns that we report in later sections. As we will 
discuss, the effects we describe are not limited to the extreme NOA deciles, and NOA predicts 
future returns even after excluding firms with M&A activity exceeding 10% of total assets. 
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 Flows are similar to those of NOA decile 8 and 9, and are slightly lower than the Cash 
Flows in deciles 2 through 7, which are quite similar to each other.   
The high level of Earnings for NOA decile 10 despite its extreme low level of 
Cash Flows reflects the extremely high Accruals in NOA decile 10 (see the discussion of 
M&A activity above). Similarly, the extreme negative accruals for NOA decile 1 
contribute to the portfolio’s low Earnings despite its moderate level of Cash Flows.  
Turning to stock market characteristics, Table 1 indicates that extreme (both high 
and low) NOA firms have the smallest size measured by either book value of equity or 
market value of equity; the lowest book-to-market ratios;
14 and the highest betas. Thus, 
the extreme deciles seem to be small, possibly high growth orientated or overvalued, and 
risky firms. It is therefore essential to control carefully for risk in measuring abnormal 
returns.   
Put Table 1 about here. 
Table 2 reports the correlations between NOA, the variable of interest, and 
various performance measures and firm characteristics. NOA is persistent; the correlation 
between NOA and lagged NOA is positive and significant. As might be expected from 
equation (3), NOA and Accruals are positively correlated.  Also consistent with Table 1 
findings, the Spearman correlations indicate that NOA is positively correlated with 
Earnings and with Cash Flows.
15  While Table 1 shows similar characteristics in terms of 
size, beta, and book-to-market for extreme levels of NOA relative to the middle deciles, 
                                                 
14 The mean book-to-market ratios in deciles 2 and 8 are similar to median measures after 
trimming extreme values at the 0.5% level. 
15 Because of outliers, the Pearson and Spearman correlations are of the opposite sign for NOA 
with Earnings and with Cash Flows.  After trimming the extremes at 0.5% the sign of Pearson 
correlations match the sign of the Spearman correlations. The non-monotonicity of Cash Flows in 
Table 1 may also contribute to the inconsistent signs between Pearson and Spearman correlations 
between NOA and Cash Flows.  
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 the correlations indicate that NOA is negatively correlated with beta, and positively 
correlated with firm size, measured as book value or market value, and with book-to-
market.  
Put Table 2 about here. 
 
3.4 Industry Distribution Across NOA Deciles  
  Table 3 reports the industry distribution of our sample across NOA deciles pooled 
across all sample years. Following Barth, Beaver, and Landsman (1998), 4-digit SIC 
industries are grouped into fourteen industry groups. Panel A reports the percentage of 
firms in each industry group for each NOA decile. Comparing between extreme NOA 
deciles 1 and 10, there is relatively lower presence in the Agriculture, Mining and 
Construction, Food, and Chemicals industry groups. The extreme NOA deciles have a 
higher presence in Durable Manufacturers, Computers, Retail, and Services industry 
groups.  In addition, NOA decile 1 has a relatively high presence in the Pharmaceuticals 
and Financial groups, and a relatively lower presence in the Extractive and Utilities 
groups.
16 NOA decile 10 has a relatively higher presence in the Extractive and Utilities 
industry groups. 
  Panel B reports the percentage of firms in each NOA decile within each industry 
group. Looking across NOA deciles, the extreme NOA deciles (1 and 10) have a 
relatively larger presence in Mining and Construction, Financial, and Services industry 
groups. Low NOA deciles additionally have a larger presence among Pharmaceuticals, 
and Computers, and high NOA deciles have a larger presence among Agriculture, 
                                                 
16 We include the financial industry in our tests (4-digit SIC codes from 6000-6999). Excluding it 
does not change the qualitative nature of our results. 
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 Extractive, and Transportation industry groups.  Given the industry variation in NOA 
noted here, our main findings remain strong with industry-demeaned NOA; see also 
Zhang (2004) for an analysis of the relation between industry NOA, firm deviation from 
the industry NOA, and future returns.  
Put Table 3 about here. 
 
 
4.  The Sustainability Effect 
  We have hypothesized that a high level of net operating assets is an indicator of 
strong past earnings performance, but also of deteriorating future financial prospects.  We 
have also hypothesized that investors with limited attention neglect this adverse indicator, 
leading to stock return predictability.  We first evaluate these hypotheses by presenting 
the time profile of accounting and stock return performance in the periods surrounding 
the ranking year for NOA deciles.  We then test the ability of NOA to predict stock 
returns controlling for standard asset pricing variables and accounting flow variables. 
 
 
4.1 Time Trends in Earnings and Returns for Extreme NOA Deciles 
  Figure 1 describes the time series means of Earnings and annual raw buy-and-
hold stock returns for the extreme NOA deciles 1 and 10.  Earnings for high NOA firms 
hit a peak—and for low NOA firms a trough—in the ranking year.  High NOA is 
associated with upward trending Earnings over the previous several years.  This upward 
trend sharply reverses after the ranking year, creating a continuing downward average 
trend in Earnings. Low NOA firms have a mirror-image trend pattern. From five years 
prior to the ranking year, average Earnings uniformly trends down. From the ranking year 
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 onwards, average Earnings uniformly trends upwards.   
  In general, behavioral accounts of over-extrapolation of earnings or sales growth 
trends involve a failure to recognize the regression phenomenon, so that forecasts of 
future earnings are sub-optimal conditional on the past time series of earnings. We see 
here that conditional on high NOA, Earnings (earnings normalized by lagged total assets) 
drops sharply. Regardless of whether there is any propensity to over-extrapolate earnings, 
an investor who, owing to limited attention, neglects the information contained in NOA 
for future earnings is in for a rude surprise.  
  Average Earnings is uniformly higher for high NOA firms than for low NOA 
firms, which reflects the respective glory or disgrace of their past. As a result, even 
though high NOA predicts a sharp drop in earnings, cross-sectionally high NOA need not 
predict lower future Earnings. This depends on the balance between the time-series and 
the cross-sectional effect.   
  Do high NOA firms, as hypothesized, earn low subsequent returns?  The annual 
raw returns of high NOA versus low NOA firms display a dramatic cross-over pattern 
through the ranking year.  High NOA firms earn higher returns than low NOA firms 
before the event year, and lower returns after.  As the event year approaches, the (non-
cumulative) annual returns of high NOA firms climb to about 45% in year –1, but the 
mean returns are under 5% in year +1.   Low NOA firms somewhat less markedly switch 
from doing poorly in year –1 to well in year +1.
17  Even as far as 5 years after the event 
year, high NOA firms are averaging annual returns lower than those of low NOA firms. 
Put Figure 1 about here. 
                                                 
17 Since there is a lag of between 4 to 16 months between the accounting numbers and the stock 
returns they are matched against, the year 0 returns may partly reflect the beginning of correction 




4.1 Are High- NOA Firms Overvalued?  Abnormal Returns Tests 
4.1.1 Abnormal Returns by NOA Deciles  
To test the sustainability hypothesis, it is important to control for risk and other 
known determinants of expected returns.  Table 4 reports the average returns of portfolios 
sorted on NOA. Every month, stocks are ranked by NOA, placed into deciles, and the 
equal-weighted and value-weighted monthly raw and abnormal returns are computed. We 
require at least a four-month gap between the portfolio formation month and the fiscal 
year end to ensure that investors have the financial statement data prior to forming 
portfolios. The average raw and abnormal returns and t-statistics on these portfolios, as 
well as the difference in returns between decile portfolio 1 (lowest ranked) and 10 
(highest ranked), are reported.   
We calculate abnormal returns using a characteristic-based benchmark to control for 
return premia associated with size, book-to-market and momentum. Whether these 
known return effects derive from risk or mispricing is debated in the literature; in either 
case, we test for an effect that is incremental to these known determinants.
18   
The benchmark portfolio is based on the matching procedure used in Daniel, 
Grinblatt, Titman, and Wermers (1997). All firms in our sample are first sorted each 
month into size quintiles, and then within each size quintile further sorted into book-to-
market quintiles (excluding negative book value firms).
19  Stocks are then further sorted 
                                                 
18 The book-to-market control may be especially important, because high- or low-NOA firms 
potentially have different growth characteristics from other firms.  Book-to-market is a standard 
inverse proxy for a firm’s growth opportunities, since, in an efficient market, a firm’s stock price 
reflects the value of its growth opportunities.  
19 Our requirement of valid NOA data tilts our sample toward larger firms. Employing all CRSP-
listed firms (with available size, book-to-market, and past twelve-month returns) to construct the 
benchmarks yielded similar, if not stronger, results for both value-weighted and equal-weighted 
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 within each of these 25 groups into quintiles based on the firm’s past 12-month returns, 
skipping the most recent month (e.g., cumulative return from t-12 to t-2). Stocks are 
weighted both equally and according to their market capitalizations within each of these 
125 groups.  The equal-weighted benchmarks are employed against equal-weighted 
portfolios, and the value-weighted benchmarks are employed against value-weighted 
portfolios.  To form a size, book-to-market, and momentum-hedged return for any stock, 
we simply subtract the return of the benchmark portfolio to which that stock belongs 
from the return of the stock. The expected value of this return is zero if size, book-to-
market, and past year return are the only attributes that affect the cross-section of 
expected stock returns. 
Using the characteristic adjustment method, Table 4 indicates that there is a strong 
and robust relation between a firm’s NOA and its subsequent abnormal stock returns for 
at least 3 years after NOA is measured: In year t+1, the average monthly adjusted equally 
weighted return spread between lowest and highest NOA deciles is 1.24% per month (t = 
10.31);  in year t+2 the effect is also strong, 0.83% per month (t = 7.66), and remains 
highly significant in year t+3, 0.57% per month (t = 5.44).
20 The average profit of a NOA 
hedge strategy (by taking a long position in NOA decile 1 and a short position in NOA 
decile 10) is more than 88% larger than that based on operating accruals (operating 
accruals divided by beginning total assets; not included in table) in year t+1, a difference 
that grows to over 138% in year t+3. 
Put Table 4 about here. 
                                                                                                                                                 
portfolios. 
20 These returns correspond to a trading strategy that is implementable in the sense that we do not 
use any ex post information to form portfolios. 
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 The return spreads after we further control for various asset pricing factors are 
generally quite similar to those basic characteristics-adjusted hedge returns. In this 
procedure, we estimate time series regressions with the raw or characteristic-adjusted 
returns of the NOA hedge portfolio as dependent variables.  The independent variables 
are either: (1) the excess return of the market portfolio (proxied by the value-weight 
CRSP portfolio), (2) the Fama-French three factor model, which contains the market 
excess returns and returns on two factor-mimicking portfolios associated with the size 
effect (SMB) and the book-to-market effect (HML), or (3) a four-factor model which 
includes returns on a momentum factor-mimicking portfolio in addition to the previous 
factors.   
We report the intercepts from these time-series regressions. As is commonly the case, 
the results are stronger using equal weights than value weights, but all intercepts are 
highly significant. The strong predictability of stock returns based upon NOA is 
consistent with the sustainability hypothesis.  
The return evidence suggests that, in the absence of market frictions, a trading 
strategy based on NOA offers a very attractive reward relative to its risk. The annualized 
Sharpe ratio of an equally-weighted strategy of going long on the lowest decile of NOA 
firms and short on the highest decile of NOA firms based on raw returns in year t+1 is 
1.36, and based on characteristic-adjusted returns in years t+1, t+2, and t+3 are 1.66, 1.23 
and 0.88 respectively. The corresponding Sharpe ratios using value-weighted 
characteristic-adjusted returns are 0.84, 0.70, and 0.60 respectively. For comparison, the 
Sharpe ratios associated with the market excess return, the size factor (SMB), the book-
to-market factor (HML), and the momentum factor (MOM) during our sample period are 
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 0.36, 0.22, 0.48, and 0.77 respectively.  
Potential gains are larger on the short side than the long side: Mean abnormal returns 
tend to be larger in absolute value for the highest NOA decile (-0.73%, -0.54%, and -
0.30%, all highly significant, in years t+1, t+2 and t+3 respectively) than for the lowest 
decile (0.51%, 0.29%, and 0.27%, all highly significant in years t+1, t+2 and t+3 
respectively).  However, even for an investor who is limited to long positions, substantial 
profits are achievable based upon the sustainability effect.  In year t+1 and t+2, there are 
significantly positive abnormal returns associated with the five lowest ranking NOA 
portfolios. Significant abnormal returns are achievable using the four lowest ranked NOA 
portfolios in year t+3 as well.  In contrast (results not reported), in this sample pure long 
trading is not profitable based upon the operating accruals anomaly.  
Figure 2 Panel A graphs the equally-weighted profits from the NOA trading strategy 
broken down by year. The strategy is consistently profitable (35 out of 38 years), with the 
loss years occurring prior to 1973.  The sustainability effect is robust with respect to the 
removal of the strongest year, 1999.  The general conclusions for value-weighted returns 
in Panel B are similar, though not as uniformly consistent. In both panels, the abnormal 
profits are substantially larger in recent years.  
Put Figure 2 about here. 
The NOA profits compare favorably with those from a strategy based on going long 
in the lowest operating accruals decile and taking a short position in the highest operating 
accruals decile. For example (not reported in tables), the equally-weighted profits from an 
NOA strategy beat the profits from an operating accruals strategy in 28 out of 38 years. 
The number of years of higher profits is more evenly split for value-weighted profits. 
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 However, for both equal and value-weighted results, NOA performs much better than 
Accruals during the last 5 years ― the accruals strategy yields significant losses in 2000, 
2001, and 2002.   
The greater predictive power of NOA suggests, as proposed in Section 2, that it is a 
better proxy for investor misperceptions, because it reflects balance sheet bloat more 
fully.  In particular, NOA reflects a cumulative effect rather than just the current-period 
flow; and, reflects past investment as well as past accruals.  It thereby provides a more 
complete measure of the deviation between past accounting value added and cash value 
added.  
 
4.1.2 Fama-MacBeth Monthly Cross-Sectional Regression 
In studies that try to document how investor psychology affects stock prices, there 
is always the question of whether the results derive from some omitted risk factor, and 
how independent the findings are from known anomalies.  By applying the Fama-
MacBeth (1973) regressions, we evaluate the relation between NOA and subsequent 
returns with an expanded set of controls, which consist of ln(size), and ln(B/M) (negative 
book value firms are excluded), and returns over past 1 month (to control for the short-
term one-month contrarian effect), past 1 year (medium-term momentum effect), and past 
three years (long-term winner/loser effect).   
Table 5 Panels A, B, and C respectively presents the Fama-MacBeth coefficients 
when individual stock returns are regressed on NOA measured one year, two years and 
three years ago. Model 1 includes standard asset pricing controls, and Model 2 
additionally includes the operating accruals variable.  The coefficients confirm the 
conclusion of past literature that these variables predict future returns.  
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 Put Table 5 about here. 
In the Model 3 regressions, NOA in each of the panels is highly significantly 
negatively related to cross-sectional stock returns, confirming the sustainability effect.  
The t-statistics on NOA in Model 3 are -8.98, -4.53 and –3.39 in Panels A, B and C 
respectively.  When both Accruals and NOA are included in the Model 4 regressions, the 
NOA coefficients remain highly significant. These findings confirm that the ability of 
NOA to predict returns is incremental to other well-known predictive variables. Panel C 
also indicates that the NOA effect is more persistent that the Accruals effect. The NOA 
t+3 result remains statistically significant whereas the Accruals t+3 result becomes 
insignificant.    
 
4.1.3 Robustness of the Sustainability Effect 
  NOA in Tables 4 and 5 is measured using the residual from total assets after 
subtracting selected financial assets to obtain operating assets and the residual from total 
assets after subtracting equity and financial liability items to obtain operating liabilities. 
This may inadvertently omit operating items or include financing items. For example, 
operating cash is often lumped together with short-term investments and so is omitted 
from our NOA measure.  Some items could be viewed as either operating or financing.  
For example, long-term marketable securities can be sold in the short-term if a cash need 
arises, and therefore can behave like a financing rather than an operating item.
21 As a 
robustness check, we consider an alternative measure, NOA_alt, in which we specifically 
select for operating asset and operating liability items.  Following Fairfield, Whisenant 
                                                 
21 Goodwill can be viewed as either an operating accrual or an investment. NOA includes both 
operating accruals and investment, so we include goodwill as part of NOA.   
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 and Yohn (2003), operating assets include: accounts receivables, inventory, other current 
assets, property, plant and equipment, intangibles, and other long-term assets. Operating 
liabilities include accounts payable, other current liabilities, and other long-term 
liabilities. Table 6 notes contain the specific Compustat item numbers. 
Put Table 6 about here. 
   Panel A of Table 6 indicates that the two measures of NOA are very similar. The 
means, medians, and standard deviations are almost identical, and their correlations with 
each other are very high. Thus, not surprisingly, all the results of Tables 4 and 5 are 
confirmed using NOA_alt in Table 6 Panels B and C. 
Panel B reports the hedge profits from the NOA_alt trading strategy calculated 
from raw and characteristics-adjusted returns, and intercepts from regressing them on 
CAPM, the Fama-French 3-factor, or 4-factor models. For brevity, only the year +1 
results are reported.  All the equally-weighted and value-weighted numbers are 
statistically significantly positive, confirming the robustness of Table 4 findings. 
Similarly, Panel C Fama-Macbeth regression results confirm that NOA is a robust 
predictor of abnormal returns, and the NOA effect is incremental to the operating 
accruals effect and other asset pricing anomalies. 
4.2 Does NOA Return Predictability Derive from Other Sources? 
  An alternative to the sustainability hypothesis is that the NOA captures some 
known anomaly distinct from the return predictors we have controlled for in previous 
tests.  For example, the predictive power of NOA might derive from current period 
operating accruals (Sloan (1996)), or from the issuance of new equity. To investigate 
these and other possibilities, in Table 7 we examine the predictive power of different 
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 components of NOA for one-year-ahead returns using Fama-Macbeth regressions.   
  NOA is the cumulative sum of operating accruals and cumulative investment 
(equation 3). Thus, in addition to current period operating accruals, NOA contains the 
current period investment, and all past operating accruals and investment. Table 7, Panel 
A indicates that NOA remains highly significant as a return predictor even after 
controlling for Accruals in the regression.  The sustainability effect is not subsumed by 
the accruals anomaly.  This implies that investment levels and past operating accruals 
matter, not just the most recent operating accruals. 
  To verify whether it is NOA that matters, or just its latest change, Panel B reports 
results from regressions that consider the latest change in NOA in addition to Accruals, 
NOA, and the asset pricing controls. The first two regressions indicate that the coefficient 
on the latest change in NOA is highly statistically significant with or without Accruals in 
the regression. This finding is consistent with Fairfield, Whisenant, and Yohn (2003). 
The next two regressions indicate that when NOA is included in the regression, 
regardless of whether Accruals is included, the latest change in NOA is no longer 
statistically significant.  The NOA variable, however, is highly statistically significant. 
Recalling equation (3), this indicates that the cumulative total of past investment and 
operating accruals matters, not just the latest investment and operating accruals. Thus, 
there is no indication that investor misperceptions are more sensitive to current period 
than past period accruals and investment.  
Since NOA reflects the history of past operating accruals, the preceding tests do 
not preclude the possibility that investment doesn’t matter, so that the effect of NOA is a 
consequence of a simple additive impact of the history of past operating accruals. The 
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 regressions in Panel C include the sum of past three years operating accruals as an 
independent variable. The major remaining orthogonal component in NOA after 
controlling for the effects of cumulative accruals is cumulative past investment. NOA 
remains highly statistically significant, which indicates that cumulative investment does 
play a role in the strong predictive power of NOA.  Comparing Panels A and B, we see 
that the inclusion of the sum of past three-year operating accruals instead of just the 
single year’s lagged operating accruals barely changes the magnitude of the NOA 
coefficient, whereas the statistical significance of NOA increases.  
The results in Panels A, B, and C together suggest that current period operating 
accruals, current period investment, and past period operating accruals and investment all 
contribute to the ability of NOA to predict returns. The sustainability effect derives from 
investor misperception about the ability of high operating accruals and high investments 
in all past periods to generate high future firm performance.  
  We also examined whether the NOA effect is related to the well-known new 
issues financing anomaly (Loughran and Ritter (1995)). From the recasted balance sheet 
equation as in Penman (2004), the value of operating activities is equal to the value of 
financing activities. In consequence, NOA equals the sum of Equity, Debt, and –Cash as 
defined in Table 1. In Panel D, we find that all three components of NOA predict returns 
with statistical significance. This indicates that cumulative net financing is a negative 
predictor of subsequent returns to the extent that it is invested in operating assets rather 
than used to accumulate cash.  
  Intuitively, if new financing is invested in operating assets, it becomes part of 
NOA and contributes to investor overoptimism. This is reflected in the negative 
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 coefficients on debt and equity. In contrast, if the new financing is retained as cash, NOA 
is unaffected. The transaction affects future returns through two coefficients, the negative 
coefficient associated with the new financing (either the equity or debt coefficient), and 
an offsetting effect of the (same-sign) coefficient on negative cash. Since the coefficients 
on the two financing variables is of the same sign as the coefficient on –Cash, the power 
of new financing to inversely predict future returns is stronger when the new capital is 
invested in operating assets than when it is held as cash. 
  Furthermore, the ability of NOA to predict returns is robust to eliminating from 
the sample firms with equity issuance exceeding 10% of total assets. These findings 
suggest that the predictive power of NOA goes beyond that of the new issues anomaly. 
We have also verified that the NOA predictability for returns is robust to excluding firms 
with M&A activity exceeding 10% of total assets. 
  An earlier draft of this paper explored the interaction between NOA and single-
period operating accruals using an interactive variable in a cross-sectional regression, as 
well as two-way portfolio sorts by NOA and accruals. The multiplicative variable was not 
statistically significant in the regression, but the two-way sorts suggested that there might 
exist a more subtle non-linear interaction. A thorough investigation of interactive effects 
is left for future research.   
 
4.3 Mishkin Test of Rationality of Investor Forecasts 
   To provide an intuitive description of how investors employ the information in 
NOA to forecast future performance, we extend the Mishkin approach to test whether the 
market efficiently weights NOA in addition to operating accruals and cash flows in 
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 predicting one-year-ahead future earnings (see Abel and Mishkin (1983) and Sloan 
(1996)). A Mishkin test attributes the incremental ability of NOA to forecast future 
returns to investor misperceptions about the ability of NOA and other variables to 
forecast future earnings.  
   Iterative weighted non-linear least squares regressions are estimated jointly 
every year for the following system of equations: 
  Earningst+1 = γ0 + γ1Accrualst+ γ2NOAt + γ3 Cash Flows t+vt+1                   (8) 
 Abnormal Rett+1=β(Earningst+1 -γ0 -γ1
*Accrualst -γ2
*NOAt -γ3
*Cash Flowst)+εt+1,  (9) 
where Abnormal Rett+1 is the raw return on security minus the return on the size, book-
to-market, and momentum matched portfolio benchmark for the year beginning four 
months after the end of the fiscal year for which operating accruals and cash flows from 
operations are measured. Earnings and Cash Flows are deflated by beginning period total 
assets for consistency with Accruals.  
The forecasting equation (8) describes the rational relation between predictors and 
future earnings. It estimates the optimal weights on Accruals, NOA, and Cash Flows in 
predicting future earnings. The second equation (9) relates abnormal returns to the 
earnings `surprise’ from the perspective of investors who do not necessarily place the 
rational weights on the predictors. This equation simultaneously estimates the weights 
that investors place on Accruals, NOA, and Cash Flows in predicting Earnings, 
optimizing the ability of the surprise to predict future returns. If the market is efficient 
and the model specification is correct, then the weights assigned by investors would not 
be statistically different from the weights assigned by the rational model for forecasting 
earnings.  In this case, γ1=γ1
*, γ2=γ2
*, and γ3=γ3
*.   
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 Because we use annual data to estimate the system of equations, we impose a 
minimum four-month gap between the fiscal year end and the start of the return 
cumulation. The CRSP returns data ends in December 2002, so the sample for the 
Mishkin test runs from fiscal year 1965 through fiscal year 2000.  We have an initial 
141,254 firm-year observations with sufficient returns and financial data during this 
period. The sample is further reduced by the requirement that observations have one-year 
ahead earnings from COMPUSTAT for the forecasting equation in the Mishkin test to 
138,483 observations. After deleting the smallest and largest 0.5% of all pooled 
observations on the financial and return variables to avoid extreme outlier effects, the 
final sample for the Mishkin test contains 130,468 firm-year observations.
22 
If we were to pool firm-year observations into a single pair of nonlinear 
regressions, the high ratio of firms to the number of time series observations could 
introduce residual cross-correlation.  We therefore run the nonlinear system for each year 
separately, and then apply a Fama-MacBeth method by estimating the times series of the 
difference between the estimated coefficients from the forecast and market equations to 
test for market efficiency.
23  
  Table 8 reports the time series averages of the annual coefficient estimates along 
with the time-series t-statistics. The statistically optimal weight, on NOA in forecasting 
                                                 
22 The estimation of the annual nonlinear Mishkin system is sensitive to extreme outliers in three 
of the 36 years in the sample period we examine.  However, trimming extreme values can induce 
bias in tests of market efficiency (see Kothari, Sabino, and Zach (2004)). We do not trim the data 
in any of the tests based upon portfolios or upon Fama-MacBeth cross-sectional regressions, so 
our inferences about the predictability of long-run returns do not rely on trimming. The additional 
insight from the Mishkin test concerns the extent to which return predictability derives from 
investor errors in forecasting future earnings from accruals or NOA. When we trim the Mishkin 
test sample at 0.25% level instead of 0.5% level in the Mishkin test in Table 8, the results are 
similar.  
23 Kothari, Sabino and Zach (2004) apply Fama-Macbeth averaging of the estimated coefficients 
across simulated independent samples in their Mishkin tests.  
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 future earnings, γ2, is an insignificant -0.004. This reflects a balance of two effects. On 
the one hand, as can be seen by comparing the earnings of high- versus low-NOA firms 
in Figure 1a, firms with high NOA contemporaneously tend to be high-earnings firms. 
On the other hand, the earnings of high NOA firms decrease subsequent to the 
conditioning date.  The low coefficient is therefore consistent with the sustainability 
hypothesis.  
Most importantly, γ2
* >γ2, implying that investors weight NOA much too 
positively in forecasting future earnings. The investors’ weight on NOA, 0.043, is highly 
significant and has the opposite sign from the point estimate of the statistically optimal 
weight. This overoptimistic perception of NOA is significantly larger than the over-
weighting of Accruals. When NOA is included in the system, the point estimate indicates 
that investors still overweight Accruals (γ1
* > γ1), as in past research, but the difference 
here is marginally insignificant (t=1.82). (The significant underweighting of cash flows 
by investors is also consistent with past research.)  Thus, the test indicates that investors 
view NOA much too positively in forecasting future earnings; the overweighting of NOA 
does not derive solely from current operating accruals. The result that investors view 
NOA too positively is robust to using Sum_Accruals or change in NOA in place of 
Accruals.  
Put Table 8 about here. 
5.  Conclusion 
If investors have limited attention, then accounting outcomes that saliently highlight 
positive aspects of a firm’s performance will encourage higher market valuations. When 
cumulative accounting value added (net operating income) over time outstrips cumulative 
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 cash value added (free cash flow), we argue that it becomes hard for the firm to sustain 
further earnings growth.  We further argue that investors with limited attention tend to 
overvalue firm whose balance sheets are ‘bloated’ in this fashion. Similarly, investors 
tend to undervalue firms when accounting value added falls short of cash value added.   
The level of net operating assets, which is the difference between cumulative earnings 
and cumulative free cash flow over time, is therefore a measure of the extent to which 
operating/reporting outcomes provoke excessive investor optimism.  As such, net 
operating assets should negatively predict subsequent stock returns. This argument allows 
for the possibility of earnings management, but does not require it.   
In our 1964-2002 sample, net operating assets do contain important information about 
the long-term sustainability of the firm’s financial performance. Firms with high net 
operating assets normalized by beginning total assets (NOA) have high and growing 
earnings prior to the conditioning date, but declining earnings subsequent to that date.  
Furthermore, NOA is a strong and highly robust negative predictor of abnormal stock 
returns for at least three years after NOA is measured. This evidence suggests that market 
prices do not fully reflect the information contained in NOA for future financial 
performance.  We call this phenomenon the sustainability effect.  
The predictive power of NOA remains strong after controlling for a wide range of 
known return predictors and asset pricing controls. NOA has stronger and more persistent 
predictive power than flow components of NOA such as operating accruals or the latest 
change in NOA. This evidence suggests that there is a cumulative effect on investor 
misperceptions of discrepancies between accounting and cash value added. Net operating 
assets therefore provide a parsimonious balance sheet measure of the degree to which 
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 investors overestimate the sustainability of accounting performance.   
A previous literature has documented that balance sheet ratios can be used to predict 
future stock returns.
24  This literature develops weighting schemes that combine various 
ratios to maximize predictive power, presumably by sweeping together a mixture of 
economic sources of predictability.  In the absence of a prior conceptual framework for 
determining optimal weights, it is not clear whether the weights will remain stable across 
samples and time periods.   
  A distinctive feature of this paper is that we employ a simple and parsimonious 
aggregate balance sheet measure, net operating assets, whose predictive power is 
motivated by a very simple psychological hypothesis. This hypothesis is that investors 
have limited attention; that they allocate this attention to an important indicator of value 
added, historical earnings; and that this comes at the cost of neglecting the incremental 
information contained in cash flow measures of value added. 
                                                 
24 See, e.g., Ou and Penman (1989), Holthausen and Larcker (1992), Lev and Thiagarajan (1993), 
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NOA and Earnings are defined in Table I. Returns are annual raw buy and hold returns 
starting four months after fiscal year end. Year 0 is the year in which firms are ranked 
and assigned into decile portfolios based on their NOA. Earnings and returns are first 


















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































 TABLE 1 
Mean (Median) Values of Selected Characteristics for Decile Portfolios Sorted by NOA 
Portfolio NOA Ranking 
   Lowest  2 3 4 5 6 7 8  9  Highest 
Panel A: Accounting Variables           
NOA  0.247 0.485 0.587 0.656 0.710 0.758 0.808 0.867  0.966 1.596 
  0.260 0.492 0.577 0.642 0.692 0.737 0.798 0.868  0.960 1.448 
Earnings  -0.042 0.032 0.068 0.084 0.092 0.100 0.105 0.110  0.116 0.084 
  0.000 0.049 0.067 0.074 0.089 0.098 0.090 0.108  0.115 0.136 
Accruals  -0.084 -0.057 -0.046 -0.039 -0.031 -0.022 -0.012 0.002 0.030  0.131 
  -0.091 -0.062 -0.052 -0.043 -0.035 -0.023 -0.010 0.001 0.035  0.134 
Cash Flows  0.042 0.090 0.114 0.123 0.123 0.122 0.118 0.108  0.086 -0.048 
  0.105 0.120 0.124 0.122 0.125 0.123 0.117 0.109  0.092 -0.034 
BV ($m)  106 247 356 476 412 379 365 316  272 202 
  82  228 321 382 316 275 337 261  201 112 
            
Panel B: Asset Pricing Variables            
MV ($m)  404 621 937  1202  1015  885 746 667  587 509 
  248 520 577 572 580 446 488 416  317 207 
B/M  0.423 1.927 0.892 0.919 0.957 0.949 0.931 4.670  0.798 0.612 
  0.439 0.695 0.747 0.800 0.838 0.849 0.870 0.821  0.736 0.580 
Beta  1.251 1.213 1.170 1.144 1.112 1.090 1.086 1.110  1.131 1.225 
    1.245 1.194 1.148 1.152 1.099 1.107 1.093 1.087  1.102 1.183 
Notes: The sample consists of a maximum of 1.63 million firm-month observations covering NYSE, AMEX 
and Nasdaq firms with available data from July 1964 to December 2002, and a total of 141,254 firm-year 
observations from fiscal year 1963 to 2000. 
 
Variable Measurement 
Raw NOA   = Operating Assets (OA)-Operating Liabilities (OL), where 
         OA   = Total Assets (Compustat #6) – Cash and Short Term Investment (Compustat #1) 
         OL   = Total Assets – STD – LTD – MI – PS - CE         
         STD  = Debt included in current liabilities (Compustat #34) 
         LTD   = Long Term Debt (Compustat #9) 
         MI   = Minority Interests (Compustat #38) 
         PS  = Preferred Stocks (Compustat #130) 
         CE  = Common Equity (Compustat #60)           
NOA = Raw NOA /Lagged Total Assets  
Earnings = Income From Continuing Operations (Compustat#178)/Lagged Total Assets 
Raw Accruals = (∆CA-∆Cash)-(∆CL-∆STD-∆TP)-Dep, where ∆ refers to annual change, and  
               CA    = Current Assets (Compustat #4) 
               CL  = Current Liabilities (Compustat #5) 
               TP   = Income Tax Payable (Compustat #71) 
             Dep   = Depreciation and Amortization (Compustat #14)         
Accruals = Raw Accruals / Lagged Total Assets  
Cash Flows = Earnings - Accruals (as defined above) 
MV = Fiscal Year End Closing Price*Shares Outstanding (Compustat #199*#25) 
BV = Book Value of Common Equity (Compustat #60), measured at fiscal year end 
Cash = Compustat #1 / Lagged Total Assets 
Equity = CE/Lagged Total Assets 
Debt = NOA – ( Equity + Cash) 
B/M = BV / MV (as defined above) 
Beta = Estimated from a regression of monthly raw returns on the CRSP NYSE/AMEX equal weighted 






























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































 TABLE 3 
Industry Composition for Decile Portfolios Sorted by NOA  
                  
  Portfolio NOA Ranking 
Industry  Groups  Lowest  2 3 4  5  6  7  8 9  Highest
                  
Panel A: Percentage of the firms in each industry group for each NOA decile (Column) 
Agriculture (0-999)  0.4  0.3 0.3 0.4  0.3  0.3  0.5  0.6 0.6  0.4 
Mining & Construction (1000-1299, 1400-1999)  3.1  2.7 2.7 2.3  2.3  2.4  2.6  2.7 3.5  3.8 
Food (2000-2111)  1.6  2.6 3.4 3.8  3.9  3.7  3.7  3.2 3.1  2.5 
Textiles and Printing/Publishing (2200-2790)   4.6  6.1 6.2 7.5  8.0  9.2 10.3 9.9 8.6 5.8 
Chemicals (2800-2824, 2840-2899)   1.9  2.6 3.4 3.9  4.3  4.0  3.5  2.9 2.3  1.8 
Pharmaceuticals (2830-2836)  12.0 4.9 3.4 2.8  2.5  2.2  2.2  2.0 2.2  2.4 
Extractive (1300-1399, 2900-2999)   3.0  3.9 5.0 5.1  5.1  4.6  5.0  5.7 6.8  8.8 
Durable Manufacturers  (3000-3569, 3580-3669, 
3680-3999)   20.2 26.2 30.3 31.2 31.8 31.3 30.1 29.1  26.0 22.1 
Computers (3570-3579, 3670-3679, 7370-7379)  18.5 19.5 14.6 11.4 9.1  8.3 7.2 7.5  8.0  11.7 
Transportation (4000-4899)  3.8  4.2 4.4 5.1  4.6  4.8  5.5  5.7 6.5  7.4 
Utilities (4900-4999)  0.8  1.2 1.9 3.2  5.0  7.0  8.0  7.2 7.0  5.0 
Retail (5000-5999)  8.8  12.9 13.3 13.5 13.5 13.1 12.1 12.4  12.5 11.6 
Financial and other (6000-6999, 2111-2199)  7.8  3.4 2.9 2.8  2.1  2.2  1.9  2.5 3.2  3.7 
Services (7000-7369, 7380-9999)  13.5  9.5 8.2 7.0  7.5  6.9  7.4  8.6 9.7 13.0 
                  
Panel B:  Percentage of the firms in each NOA decile for each industry group (Row) 
Agriculture (0-999)  9.8  7.3 7.3 9.8  7.3  7.3  12.2 14.6 14.6 9.8 
Mining & Construction (1000-1299, 1400-1999)  11.0  9.6 9.6 8.2  8.2  8.5  9.3  9.6 12.5 13.5 
Food (2000-2111)  5.1 8.3  10.8 12.1 12.4 11.7 11.7 10.2 9.8  7.9 
Textiles and Printing/Publishing (2200-2790)   6.0  8.0 8.1 9.8 10.5 12.1 13.5 13.0  11.3 7.6 
Chemicals (2800-2824, 2840-2899)   6.2 8.5  11.1 12.7 14.1 13.1 11.4 9.5 7.5 5.9 
Pharmaceuticals (2830-2836)  32.8 13.4 9.3 7.7  6.8 6.0 6.0 5.5  6.0 6.6 
Extractive (1300-1399, 2900-2999)   5.7  7.4 9.4 9.6  9.6  8.7  9.4  10.8 12.8 16.6 
Durable Manufacturers  (3000-3569, 3580-3669, 
3680-3999)   7.3 9.4  10.9 11.2 11.4 11.2 10.8 10.5 9.3  7.9 
Computers (3570-3579, 3670-3679, 7370-7379)  16.0 16.8 12.6 9.8  7.9 7.2 6.2 6.5  6.9  10.1 
Transportation (4000-4899)  7.3  8.1 8.5 9.8  8.8  9.2  10.6 11.0 12.5 14.2 
Utilities (4900-4999)  1.7  2.6 4.1 6.9 10.8 15.1 17.3 15.6  15.1 10.8 
Retail (5000-5999)  7.1 10.4 10.8 10.9 10.9  10.6 9.8 10.0  10.1 9.4 
Financial and other (6000-6999, 2111-2199)  24.0 10.5 8.9  8.6  6.5 6.8 5.8 7.7  9.8  11.4 
Services  (7000-7369, 7380-9999)  14.8  10.4 9.0  7.7  8.2 7.6 8.1 9.4  10.6 14.2 
 
Notes: NOA is defined in Table 1. The reported percentiles are the averages across all sample years. The bold numbers in 
Panel A are the top three biggest industry groups represented within each NOA decile.  The bold numbers in Panel B are the 





Average Monthly Abnormal Returns for NOA Decile Portfolios 
One, Two and Three Years after Portfolio Formation 
                   
   Equal Weighted                        Value Weighted 
Portfolio     raw_ew  adj_ew  adj_ew  adj_ew    raw_vw  adj_vw  adj_vw  adj_vw 
Ranking     t+1  t+1  t+2  T+3     t+1  t+1     t+2  t+3 
                 
Lowest   0.0179  0.0051  0.0029  0.0027   0.0106  0.0022  0.0012  0.0015 
   4.87 6.14  3.64  3.25    3.77 2.35  1.28 1.41 
2   0.0168  0.0032  0.0014  0.0012   0.0107  0.0021 0.0004  0.0011 
   5.09 5.70  2.66  2.47    4.17 2.81  0.58 1.64 
3   0.0157  0.0015  0.0012  0.0012   0.0113  0.0017 0.0009  0.0008 
   5.25 3.76  3.06  3.06    4.82 2.96  1.50 1.39 
4   0.0146  0.0012  0.0013  0.0014   0.0091  0.0007 0.0013  0.0003 
   5.15 3.03  3.40  3.15    4.20  1.31  2.70  0.55 
5   0.0146  0.0012  0.0009  0.0008   0.0094  0.0005 0.0007  0.0001 
   5.42 3.14  2.13  1.75   4.41  0.98  1.33  0.15 
6   0.0135  0.0000  0.0006  -0.0003    0.0087 -0.0005  -0.0000  -0.0001 
   5.13  0.03 1.48  -0.60    4.02  -0.96 -0.03  -0.21 
7   0.0133  0.0002  -0.0005  -0.0000   0.0089 -0.0004  -0.0012  -0.0008 
   5.12  0.38 -1.15 -0.01    4.01  -0.68  -2.16  -1.31 
8   0.0106  -0.0022  -0.008  -0.0008   0.0074 -0.0013  -0.0013  -0.0003 
   4.00 -5.50  -1.90 -1.75    3.22 -2.13  -2.30  -0.52 
9   0.0093  -0.0028  -0.0016  -0.0015   0.0072 -0.0017  -0.0011  -0.0011 
   3.41 -6.34  -3.60  -3.37    3.17 -2.76  -1.63 -1.58 
Highest   0.0031  -0.0073  -0.0054  -0.0030   0.0030  -0.0047  -0.0047 -0.0035 
   0.95  -12.22 -8.42 -4.85   1.01 -5.65 -4.45  -4.02 
                  
Hedge(L-H)  0.0148 0.0124  0.0083  0.0057    0.0076 0.0069  0.0060  0.0049 
   8.45 10.31  7.66  5.44    4.18 5.24  4.34  3.73 
CAPM α   0.0153  0.0127 0.0086 0.0063    0.0075 0.0068  0.0063  0.0053 
   8.63 10.45  7.75  5.99    4.21 5.52  4.88  3.91 
Three Factor  α   0.0165  0.0134 0.0095 0.0074    0.0094 0.0075  0.0069  0.0063 
   10.00 11.17  8.65  7.16    5.40 5.95  5.30  4.64 
Four Factor  α   0.0140  0.0126 0.0088 0.0067    0.0074 0.0061  0.0054  0.0058 
      8.32  10.08  7.66  6.22     3.93  4.70  4.06  4.10 
 
Notes: NOA is defined in Table 1. Decile portfolios are formed monthly from July 1964 to December 2002 based on 
NOA of the previous fiscal year, with a minimum 4 month lag between the fiscal year end and the portfolio 
formation month.  
The monthly equal-weighted (value-weighted) abnormal return for any individual stock is calculated by subtracting 
the equal-weighted return of a benchmark portfolio matched by size, book-to-market and momentum from the return 
of the stock. It is then averaged within each decile. The hedge portfolio consists of a long position in the lowest 
ranked NOA portfolio and an offsetting short position in the highest ranked NOA portfolio. Reported are the time 
series averages of the monthly portfolio returns along with their t-statistics. In addition, the intercepts, α, from time-
series regressions of the raw returns or characteristics adjusted returns of the hedge portfolio on the CAPM model 
which employs excess return of the market portfolio, the Fama-French three factor model, which contains the 
market portfolio and two factor-mimicking portfolios associated with the size effect (SMB) and the book-to-market 
effect (HML), and a four factor model which adds a momentum factor-mimicking portfolio to the previous factors, 
are reported. 































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































 TABLE 6 
Additional Results Based on Alternative NOA Definition 
 
Panel A: Summary Statistics          






correlation    
       NOA_alt  NOA_alt     
NOA 0.9427  0.7254 22.21  0.92  0.87     
NOA_alt  0.9407  0.7374  22.71  .  .       
             
Panel B: Hedge Returns based on Alternative NOA decile portfolios one year after portfolio formation   
   raw_ewt+1 adj_ewt+1 raw_vwt+1 adj_vwt+1    
Hedge(L-H)    0.0135 0.0116  0.0066  0.0058     
   7.30 9.32  3.25  4.03    
CAPM α   0.0136 0.0117  0.0069  0.0062     
   7.32 9.43  3.38  4.34    
Three Factor  α   0.0143 0.0122  0.0084  0.0067     
   8.20 9.96  4.09  4.59    
Four Factor  α   0.0134 0.0118  0.007  0.0056     
      7.47 9.36  3.32  3.77       
             
Panel C: Fama-Macbeth Monthly Regressions        
 LnSize  LnB/M  Ret(-1:-1)  Ret(-12:-2) Ret(-36:-13)  Accruals  NOA_alt 
Model 1  -0.0011  0.0027  -0.0719  0.0058  -0.0027     
 -2.41  3.79  -16.38  3.44 -3.93   
Model 2  -0.0012  0.0026  -0.0723  0.0056  -0.0023  -0.0130   
 -2.50  3.65  -16.51  3.35 -3.42  -6.88   
Model 3  -0.0010  0.0029  -0.0722  0.0057  -0.0023    -0.0066 
 -2.24  4.15  -16.53  3.36 -3.47   -8.92 
Model 4  -0.0011  0.0028  -0.0726  0.0055  -0.0021  -0.0078  -0.0057 
   -2.32  4.07  -16.64  3.30  -3.21  -3.77  -6.93 
 
Note: 
NOA_alt = (AR+INV+OTHERCA+PPE+INTANG+OTHERLTA-AP-OTHERCL-OTHERLTL)/Lagged Total Assets 
where: 
AR =  Account  Receivable  (Compustat#2)     
INV  =   Inventory (Compustat#3) 
OTHERCA  =   Other Current Assets (Compustat #68) 
PPE  =   Net Property, Plant And Equipment (Compustat#8) 
INTANG  =   Intangibles (Compustat#33)     
OTHERLTA =   Other Long Term Assets (Compustat#69)  
AP  =   Account Payable (Compustat#70)     
OTHERCL  =  Other Current Liabilities (Compustat#72) 
OTHERLTL  =   Other Long Term Liabilities (Compustat#75) 
 
Accruals is defined in Table 1. See Table 4 for details on the portfolio formation procedure and the calculation of 
hedge returns, CAPM α, three-factor α and four-factor α. LnSize, Ln(B/M), Ret(-1:-1), Ret(-12:-2) and Ret(-36,-13) 
are defined in Table 5  The Fama-MacBeth procedure is the same as in Table 5. Bold numbers indicate significance at 
































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































 TABLE 8 
Annual Nonlinear Generalized Least Square Regressions (Mishkin Test) of 
Rational and Market Forecasting of Firm Returns and One-Year Ahead Earnings  
 





   Parameters     Mean Estimate    T-statistics    
γ1   0.557    3.60    Accruals 
γ1
∗   0.628    14.57   
γ2   -0.004    -0.57   
NOA 
γ2
∗   0.043    3.10   
γ3   0.663    41.99   
Cash Flows 
γ3
∗   0.552    16.43   
   β     1.506     13.96    
Test of Market Efficiency:    T-test 
# of years when γn<γn
* (36 years 
total)  
Accruals  γ1=γ1
*    1.82   22   
NOA  γ2=γ2
*    4.18   28   
Cash Flows γ 3=γ3
*     -4.18      11    
 
Notes: Due to the limited annual observations before fiscal year 1965, the sample consists of firm-year 
observations from fiscal year 1965 to 2000. Accruals, NOA, Earnings and Cash Flows are defined in 
Table 1. The annual abnormal return for any individual stock is calculated by subtracting the equal-
weighted return of a benchmark portfolio matched by size, book-to-market and momentum from the 
annual raw buy and hold return of the stock. Returns are measured starting four months after fiscal 
year end.  The system of equation is estimated annually using non-linear generalized least squares. The 
time-series average of the annual coefficients estimates and their associated t-statistics (in italics) for 
γn
*=
 γn are reported. Bold numbers indicate significance at less than 5% level (2-tail t-test). 
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